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Abstract 
 
A Comparative Analysis of Divergent Immigration Policies for Foreign 
Elderly Care Workers in Japan and South Korea  
 
Jasmine Zahra Bisheh, M.A. 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2017 
 
Supervisor: Patricia Maclachlan 
 
 In the midst of labor shortages and socio-demographic pressures, Japan and South 
Korea are facing an increasing demand for elderly care. In order to respond to this 
demand, these nations have both looked to a foreign labor source. However, these two 
countries have elected different strategies and policies for foreign elderly care workers. 
This paper seeks to explore the ways in which Japan and South Korea have responded to 
the demand for foreign elderly care workers and why they have differed in their policy 
responses. While facing similar demographic trends and labor shortages, Japan and South 
Korea have enacted different policies due to national leadership and varying political 
influences of civil society.  
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 1 
Introduction 
Today, in the midst of socio-demographic pressures, many industrialized nations 
are facing an increasing demand for elderly care. This “care crisis” has been particularly 
prevalent in countries like Japan and South Korea, where elderly care is extremely vital 
to a large portion of the population. In Japan, experts estimate that people over 65 and 
above will make up forty percent of the population by 2060.1 Furthermore, the United 
Nations estimates that in South Korea people aged 60 and above will make up forty 
percent of the population in 2050.2 In these two nations, an extremely low fertility rate 
coupled with a rapidly aging population has led to a decrease in workers, especially in 
care work. 
 In order to respond to increasing demands for care, many advanced industrialized 
nations have looked to a foreign labor source.3 Countries like Germany, Canada, and 
Spain are progressive in this regard, as they accept large numbers of foreign workers into 
their societies.4 Although Japan and South Korea have also turned to a temporary foreign 
labor source, both remain far more conservative than other industrialized nations.5 
Despite their similar cases, these two countries have elected different strategies and 
policies for foreign elderly care workers. With one of the most highly restrictive 
                                                
1 Gabriel Dominguez. “Impact of Japan’s Shrinking Population Already Palpable” Deutsche Welle. 
Deutsche Welle, 1 June 2015. Web. 24 Sept. 2016. 
2 Min-Hua Chang. Issue Brief no. 1154. NUS East Asia Institute. National University of Singapore, 14 July 
2016. Web. 2 Feb. 2017. 
3 Fareed Zakaria. “Immigration Lessons for the U.S. from around the World,” CNN. CNN, 10 June 2012. 
Web. 27 Feb. 2017. 
4 Jiyeon Song. “Labor markets, care regimes, and foreign care worker policies in East Asia,” Social Policy 
& Administration 49.3 (2015); 376-93. Print. 
5 Ibid. 
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immigration policies in the world, Japan only modestly opened its doors to foreign 
elderly care workers from the Philippines, Indonesia and Vietnam through bilateral 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) in 2008. These Southeast Asian workers are 
only permitted to work in designated care facilities and hospitals, never in private homes. 
Due to strict immigration policies and requirements, the number of certified foreign care 
workers in Japan remains miniscule.6 Contrastingly, South Korea has taken a more open 
stance in making policy changes, which allow Chinese workers of Korean descent to fill 
the need for elderly care.7 These co-ethnic workers can legally work in hospitals, care 
facilities, and private households.8 As a result, they constitute over half of the elderly care 
workforce in South Korea.9  
This paper seeks to explore the ways in which Japan and South Korea have 
responded to the demand for foreign care workers and why they have differed in their 
policy responses. Why have the policy outcomes been so different in such similar cases? 
What are the implications of Japan’s closed policy versus South Korea’s more open 
policy? What have been the benefits and drawbacks of each approach? By examining the 
political systems and strategies of these two countries, this paper will discuss the tension 
between immigration policies, national leadership, and civil society.  
While facing similar demographic trends and labor shortages, Japan and South 
Korea have enacted different policies due to national leadership and varying political 
                                                
6 Republic of the Philippines. Technical Education And Skills Development Authority. Fresh Batch of 
Nurses, Caregivers Complete Japanese Language Training. N.p.: n.p., 2016. Web. 23 Sept. 2016. 
7 Hye-Kyung Lee. “Preference for Co-ethnic Groups in Korean Immigration Policy: A Case of Ethnic 
Nationalism?” Korean Observer 41.4 (2010): 559-91. Print. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
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influences of civil society. In Japan, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party has maintained 
strict immigration laws and views foreign labor as a last resort to solving any 
demographic issues.10 As a result, their policies have been more conservative. On the 
other hand, South Korea’s national leadership, from both progressive and conservative 
parties, has advocated for the acceptance of foreign workers and enacted policy to assist 
foreign workers with legal employment. In this way, their policies have been more 
liberal. In addition, South Korea has an active civil society with numerous immigration 
support groups that hold enough political influence to sway the president and the 
bureaucracy. In Japan, these kinds of groups do not have the same level of political 
influence and have little effect on policy changes. As a result, immigration policy is more 
actively shaped advocates for foreign workers in South Korea, while the same is not 
necessarily the case in Japan.  
This paper will begin with an examination of the demand for foreign labor in both 
Japan and South Korea. Then, section two will highlight the immigration policies of 
Japan and South Korea in historic context, as well as recent changes and their current 
status today. Section three will describe Japan’s policies for foreign elderly care workers 
through economic partnership agreements with the Philippines, Indonesia and Vietnam. 
Subsequently, the fourth section will illuminate South Korea’s policies for Chinese-
Korean workers, or Joseonjok, in the elderly care industry. Section three and four will 
also evaluate the current outcomes and effectiveness of these policies. The next few 
                                                
10 Junichi Akashi. “New Aspects of Japan’s Immigration Policies: Is Population Decline Opening the 
Doors?” Contemporary Japan 26 (2014): 175-96. 2014. Web. 18 Sept. 2016. 
 4 
sections will shift to an analysis of why these countries have differed in their policy 
responses. The fifth section will illuminate national leadership in Japan and South Korea, 
as well as how the governments have crafted different policies for foreign elderly care 
workers. The sixth section will discuss the level of political influence that civil society 
groups have in Japan and South Korea. This section will examine anti-immigrant groups, 
immigrant rights groups, the business sector, professional organizations, labor unions and 
other non-government organizations.  
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Chapter 1: A Common Demand for Labor 
One of the major problems facing Japan and South Korea today is a severe labor 
shortage. From construction workers to engineers, waiters to nurses, a labor shortage is 
impeding these nations’ economies. Workers, both skilled and unskilled, are in demand. 
Working-age populations peaked in the mid 1990s and, since then, have been in decline. 
According to the Japan Immigration Policy Institute, Japan will need to accept 10 million 
immigrant workers over the next fifty years.11 Similarly, the Korea Economic Institute 
reported that South Korea will need to receive 11.8 million by 2050 to compensate for the 
declining demand for labor.12 The growing seriousness of this issue cannot be ignored in 
either country.  
These labor shortages are due to a combination of factors including low fertility 
rates, rapidly aging populations and evolving education interests. Japan and South Korea 
have two of the lowest fertility rates in the world (see figures 1 and 2).13 According to 
Japan’s Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, the estimated number of newborn babies 
fell to an all time low for the fourth straight year in 2014.14 Similarly in 2014, the Wall 
Street Journal estimated that only 8.6 babies were born for every one thousand people in 
                                                
11 Giovanni Ganelli and Naoko Miake. Foreign Help Wanted: Easing Japan’s Labor Shortage. Working 
Paper. N.p. : International Monetary Fund, 2015. Web. 2 Feb. 2017. 
12 Sang-Hun, Choe. “South Korea’s Plan to Rank Towns by Fertility Rate Backfires.” The New York 
Times. The New York Times, 30 Dec. 2016. Web. 24 Feb. 2017. 
13 Fertility Rates (Births per Woman). Publication. N.p.: World Bank Group, 2015. The World Bank. Web. 
24 Feb. 2017. 
14 Gabriel Dominguez. “Impact of Japan’s Shrinking Population Already Palpable” Deutsche Welle. 
Deutsche Welle, 1 June 2015. Web. 24 Sept. 2016. 
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South Korea.15 Currently, Japan has a fertility rate of 1.4 and South Korea has a fertility 
rate of 1.1.16 These are both well below the necessary replacement level of 2.1 children.17  
 
 
Figure 1:  Japan’s Birth Rate 
 
 
Figure 2: South Korea’s Birth Rate 
 
 
                                                
15 Jeyup S. Kwaak. “South Korea Birth Rate Hits Lowest on Record.” The Wall Street Journal. The Wall 
Street Journal, 22 Aug. 2014. Web. 24 Feb. 2017. 
16 Fertility Rates (Births per Woman). Publication. N.p.: World Bank Group, 2015. The World Bank. Web. 
24 Feb. 2017. 
17 Ibid. 
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In addition to these extremely low fertility rates, rapidly aging populations have 
led to a decrease in workers (see figures 3 and 4).18 As explained earlier, these nations’ 
aging populations have already contributed to the labor shortages. Furthermore, higher 
levels of educational attainment have changed the level of skill and occupational 
preferences of young, working persons.19 Workers avoid the dirty (kitanai), dangerous 
(kiken), and demanding (kitsui) “3K” or “3D” jobs in order to obtain higher status 
positions.20 Such factors have contributed to a widespread shortage of labor, especially in 
“3D” jobs, such as manufacturing, construction, agriculture, and care work. The care 
industry, in particular, is a sector where applicants are not meeting job openings.21 
 
 
Figure 3: Japan’s Population 65 years and over 
                                                
18 Aging Populations: 65 and Over. Publication. N.p.: World Bank Group, 2015. The World Bank. Web. 24 
Feb. 2017. 
19 Betsy Brody. Opening the Door: Immigration, Ethnicity, and Globalization in Japan. New York: 
Routledge, 2002. Print. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Japan: Selected Issues. Rep. no. 16/268. Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2016. Web. 26 
Feb. 2017. 
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 Figure 4: South Korea’s Population 65 years and over 
The work in these industries has instead attracted workers from other nearby 
Asian countries. Many service roles including elderly care, childcare, and nursing have 
relied on a foreign work force. The Japanese and South Korean governments have opened 
their doors to foreign care workers in response to their labor shortages. However, as the 
next section will indicate, their overarching immigration policies have been quite 
divergent. 
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Chapter 2: Immigration Policies in Historic Context 
Understanding Japan and South Korea’s differing positions toward foreign 
workers requires observation of past immigration policies. Due to shared structural and 
historical factors, Japan and South Korea maintained very similar immigration policies 
for unskilled foreign workers up until the 2000s.22 Japan’s laws served as a model for 
South Korea, as the nation adopted many of Japan’s established policies. These policies 
were defined by four main characteristics: 1) the reluctance of the state to admit unskilled 
foreign workers; 2) admission of a variety of temporary foreign workers through limited 
channels such as trainee programs; 3) admission of large numbers of unauthorized 
workers, and 4) denial of rights to social incorporation.23 These countries were both 
known for strict immigration policies that favored professional workers and temporary 
visas. However, in the 2000s,  they began to diverge, as South Korea revised its policies 
to become more open and Japan remained relatively closed.24 The following subsections 
will describe and explain in greater detail the evolution of immigration policies in Japan 
and South Korea. 
Japan 
Japan has one of the most highly restrictive immigration laws in the world. It 
operates under a fundamentally closed-door policy with emphasis on temporary workers. 
                                                
22 Keiko Yamanaka. “Civil Society and Social Movements for Immigrant Rights in Japan and South Korea: 
Convergence and Divergence in Unskilled Immigration Policy,” Korean Observer 49.1 (2010): 615-47. 
Print. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Dong-Hoon Seol. “Which Multiculturalism? Discourse of the Incorporation of Immigrants into Korean 
Society,” Korean Observer 49.1 (2010): 593-614. Print. 
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As a result, its population is composed of an extremely small percentage of foreign 
residents when compared with other advanced industrialized countries. It has a foreign 
population of less than two percent, which is six times smaller than the percentage of the 
US (see figure 5).25 However, Japan has been receiving immigrants throughout the 
twentieth century.26 Immigrants have been categorized as either “old comers, ” 
immigrants from prewar Japan, or “new comers, “ foreign laborers from the 1980s to the 
present day.27 
 
Figure 5:  Foreign Populations in Industrialized Nations, Total % of population 
                                                
25 Fareed Zakaria. “Immigration Lessons for the U.S. from around the World,” CNN. CNN, 10 June 2012. 
Web. 27 Feb. 2017. 
26 Takeyuki Tsuda, and Wayne A. Cornelius. “Japan: Government Policy, Immigrant Reality,” Controlling 
Immigration: A Global Perspective. Ed. Wayne A. Cornelius, Takeyuki Tsuda, Philip L. Martin, and James 
F. Hollifield. 2nd ed. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2004. 439-76. Print. 
27 Erin Aeran Chung. Immigration and Citizenship in Japan. New York: Cambridge UP, 2010. Print. 
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Immigration to Japan was widespread during Japan’s colonization period. From 
1910-1945, over two million Korean workers immigrated to Japan. Today, the Japanese 
government has still not fully incorporated these prewar immigrants and their fourth 
generation descendents into society. These zainichi, or ethnic Koreans in Japan, are 
considered only permanent residents without full citizenship rights such as the right to 
vote.28 They also face social and economic discrimination within Japanese society.29 This 
example suggests that Japanese immigration policy operates under the assumption that 
non-Japanese do not have the capacity to become Japanese and therefore should be 
excluded.30  This mindset reflects why Japan maintains primarily temporary work visas 
for foreigners, ensuring that non-Japanese do not fully incorporate into society. As this 
paper will explore in a later section, foreign care workers face similar exclusions that 
stem from both attitudinal and legal constraints in Japan. 
For a brief period of time, Japan was one of the only industrialized nations that 
did not rely on unskilled foreign labor to drive its economy. Although Japan suffered 
labor shortages in the late 1960s and early 1970s, increases in labor productivity and the 
mobilization of women, elderly and rural workers ensured labor needs were met. 
However, the rise in the value of the yen, labor shortages and the development of 
transnational networks led to a large influx of foreign labor in the late 1980s.31  
                                                
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Nana Oishi. “Immigration and Social Integration in Japan.” International Perspectives: Integration and 
Inclusion. Ed. James S. Frideres and John Biles. Kingston, Ont.: School of Policy Studies, Queen’s U, 
2012. 165-84. Print. 
 12 
Enacted in 1952, the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act (ICRRA) 
provided much of the basic framework for immigration policy in Japan. It served to 
monitor and control foreigners rather than encourage migrant settlement or facilitate 
acquisition of Japanese citizenship.32 In 1990, the law was revised in two ways to address 
the growing demand for unskilled foreign labor. One of the revisions established 
residential status with no restrictions on employment for Nikkeijin, descendents of 
Japanese emigrants. As a result, large numbers of Brazilian and Peruvian Nikkeijin 
immigrated to Japan to fill unskilled labor positions.33 The second change involved the 
creation of two new training programs to target workers from developing countries. The 
Industrial Trainee Program (ITP) intended to provide trainees with language and cultural 
education as well as “on the job training” at medium-sized corporations for the first 
year.34 After that time, trainees would then work as “technical interns” for a limit of three 
years in the Technical Intern Program (TIP).35  
While intended to provide rich training experiences for workers, these programs 
have caused various labor and human rights abuses. One of the most recent examples can 
be seen in the death of a Filipino technical trainee by karoshi, death by overwork.36 This 
man had logged up to 122.5 hours of overtime per month, before he died of heart 
failure.37 In 2015, Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare (MHLW) found that 3,695 
                                                
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 “2014 Death of Overworked Filipino Trainee Recognized as ‘karoshi’ by Labor Ministry.” The Japan 
Times. The Japan Times, 17 Oct. 2016. Web. 17 Oct. 2016. 
37 Ibid. 
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firms were violating labor laws.38 These programs allow Japan to receive cheap, unskilled 
foreign labor while maintaining a strict closed-door policy. However, they have only 
been mildly successful in truly addressing the labor shortage. According to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2016, visa conditions and requirements barring 
unskilled workers ensure foreigners make up only 1.4 percent of the workforce, 
compared with the 5 percent or more found in most advanced countries.39  
In the 1990s, the Japanese economy entered the longest recession of the postwar 
period. However, the number of foreign workers still continued to increase. Many 
policies to address these growing numbers were enacted in the 2000s. In 2004, the 
government amended the ICRRA once again as a response to the perception among the 
public that foreigners had increased crime rates.40 The amendment sought to decrease the 
number of illegal foreign residents by expanding immigration control personnel, 
strengthening deportation procedures and creating stricter examinations of foreigners 
upon entering the country.41 In the following years, noteworthy initiatives continued to be 
introduced including new “Guidelines for Permanent Residence” (2006), the ratification 
of economic partnership agreements with the Philippines and Indonesia (2006-7) and the 
establishment of fingerprinting requirements for foreign residents (2007).42  
                                                
38 Ibid. 
39 Linda Sieg and Ami Miyazako. “Japan Eyes More Foreign Workers, Stealthily Challenging Immigration 
Taboo,” Reuters. Reuters, 26 Apr. 2016. Web. 25 Sept. 2016. 
40 Japan. Ministry of Justice. Immigration Bureau of Japan. Law for Partial Amendment of Immigration 
Control and Refugee Recognition Act. Ministry of Justice, 2004. Web. 18 Sept. 2016. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Junichi Akashi. “New Aspects of Japan’s Immigration Policies: Is Population Decline Opening the 
Doors?” Contemporary Japan 26 (2014): 175-96. 2014. Web. 18 Sept. 2016. 
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In 2008, the government announced a plan to increase the number of foreign 
students in Japan. Under this initiative, known as the “300,000 Foreign Students Plans, ” 
foreign students are allowed to acquire three to five year work visas upon the completion 
of their studies. Students can also apply for permanent resident status after an established 
period of time. It is interesting to note that Japan has given foreign students the 
opportunity of education, employment, and long-term stay; however, for unskilled 
foreign workers, including trainees, it has not. The government is reluctant to extend 
long-term benefits to those who might stay permanently. This discrepancy can be 
interpreted as the government’s prioritization of accepting skilled, educated labor over 
presumably unskilled trainees.  Some of this resistance can be explained by fears of 
professionalism, job security, and social unrest. 
A second partial amendment to the ICRRA was introduced in 2009. This revision 
created a new status of residence system involving the issuance of resident cards and a 
Permanent Resident Certificate.43 It also established a revision of status of residence 
categories, an extension of maximum periods of stay from three to five years, a special 
re-entry system and a supervision committee for immigration detention centers.44 Once 
again, Japan made its immigration priorities known when it established the “Points-Based 
System for Highly Skilled Foreign Professionals” in 2012. Under this system, highly 
skilled workers are given “preferential immigration treatment” and are even allowed to 
                                                
43 Japan. Ministry of Justice. Immigration Bureau of Japan. Changes to the Immigration Control and 
Refugee Act. Ministry of Justice, 2009. Web. 18 Sept. 2016. 
44 Japan’s Special Re-entry System states that foreign nationals, who are reentering Japan within a year of 
their departure, are not required to apply for a re-entry permit as long as they have a valid passport and 
residence card. 
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bring parents or maids from abroad.45 These initiatives demonstrate official policy to 
target skilled workers, which nations such as the US also emphasize. The Ministry of 
Justice (MOJ) claims their programs seek “quality, unsubstitutable human resources who 
have a complementary relationship with domestic capital and labor.”46 These individuals 
are “expected to bring innovation to the Japanese industries, to promote development of 
specialized/technical labor markets through friendly competition with Japanese people 
and to increase efficiency of the Japanese labor markets.”47 Classified as unskilled 
laborers, opportunities for foreign care workers are constrained by this prioritization. 
Despite the many restrictions, foreign workers are still drawn to Japan for its promises of 
economic prosperity and technological advancement.  
Fundamentally, Japan is closed to immigrant settlement as it considers all foreign 
workers to be short-term guests. In 1990, the association between permanent residency 
and citizenship was removed from the ICRRA.48 The ICRRA was originally based on the 
US model, which encouraged all immigrants’ eventual citizenship.49 The defense of this 
revision was based on the government’s claim that Japan is not a country of immigration 
and that migrants should only be admitted temporarily.50 This constant insistence on 
labeling foreign workers as temporary, rather than potential permanent residents, has 
postponed the formation of any explicit national level laws and programs to facilitate 
                                                
45 Japan. Ministry of Justice. Immigration Bureau of Japan. Points-Based System for Highly Skilled 
Foreign Professionals. Ministry of Justice, 2012. Web. 18 Sept. 2016. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Kristin Surak. “Convergence in Foreigners' Rights and Citizenship Policy? A Look at Japan,” 
International Migration Review, 42 (3). pp. 550-575. 2008. Web. 18 Sept. 2016. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
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social integration of settled immigrants.51 According to the United Nation’s Department 
of Economic and Social Affairs, immigrants often experience “involuntary 
exclusion…from society’s political, economic, and societal processes, which prevents 
their full participation in the society.”52 In Japan’s case, foreign workers, who are often in 
economically and socially precarious states, do not have access to adequate support 
through information centers, public services, employment opportunities, as well as 
connection to Japanese society.53  
As this subsection has shown, Japan has tightly controlled immigration for 
decades and has only targeted certain groups, namely students and professionals, to more 
work in Japan. Despite the need for a variety of laborers, there has not been an opening in 
immigration policy for unskilled workers. While Japan allows foreign nurses and care 
workers entry through economic partnership agreements, it imposes strict requirements 
that keep the number of these workers limited.  
South Korea 
Today, foreign workers make up 3.7 percent of all employed persons in South 
Korea.54 However, this was not always the case as South Korea followed an immigration 
trajectory similar to Japan’s up until the 2000s. Like Japan, the South Korean government 
                                                
51 Ibid. 
52 A.B. Atkinson and E. Marlier. Analyzing and Measuring Social Inclusion in a Global Context. Rep. no 
ST/ESA/325. United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 2010. Web. 17 Mar. 2017. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Su-ji Park. “A Country Where, without Foreigners, the Factories Would Close,” The Hankyoreh. The 
Hankyoreh, 30 Dec. 2016. Web. 24 Feb. 2017. 
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enacted an Immigration Control Act (ICA) in 1963.55 Amended dozens of times since 
then, the ICA continues to dictate South Korea’s immigration policy today. As in Japan, 
prior to the mid 1980s, South Korea had very little experience with immigrant groups.56 
Earlier demands for labor had been met by internal migration from poorer, rural regions 
and increased utilization of previously untapped labor sources such as women and the 
elderly.57 However, in the 1980s, South Korea experienced a large influx of immigrants 
due to increasing labor shortages in 3K jobs and industrialization.  
In the late 1980s, the Chinese and South Korean governments began to allow 
Joseonjok, co-ethnic Koreans in China, to visit their relatives in South Korea.58 As a 
result, a large number of these individuals stayed illegally and filled many 3K positions.59 
In 1991, in response large numbers of illegal workers and labor demands, the government 
followed the Japanese model and enacted the Industrial Technical Training Program 
(ITTP).60 Under this program, foreigners would come to South Korea to work in 
industries faced with labor shortages, such as textiles or construction.61 According to the 
United Nations’ International Labor Organization (ILO) in 1990s, workers were entitled 
                                                
55 Dong-Hoon Seol. “Which Multiculturalism? Discourse of the Incorporation of Immigrants into Korean 
Society,” Korean Observer 49.1 (2010): 593-614. Print. 
56 Takeyuki Tsuda. Local Citizenship in Recent Countries of Immigration: Japan in Comparative 
Perspective. Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2006. Print. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Hye-Kyung Lee. “Preference for Co-ethnic Groups in Korean Immigration Policy: A Case of Ethnic 
Nationalism?” Korean Observer 41.4 (2010): 559-91. Print. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ock Hyun-ju. “South Korea’s Foreign Worker Policy Founders.” The Korea Herald. The Korea Herald, 
23 Mar. 2016. Web. 24 Feb. 2017. 
61 Jiyeon Song. “Labor markets, care regimes, and foreign care worker policies in East Asia,” Social Policy 
& Administration 49.3 (2015); 376-93. Print. 
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to fair wages, paid leave, occupational safety and job mobility.62 While technically 
classified as “trainees” rather than “workers”, individuals in the ITTP were not entitled to 
basic labor protections, market-based wage rates or the right to change jobs.63 This highly 
exploitative employment system was used as a source of cheap and unskilled labor from 
other less developed Asian countries such as Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia, Uzbekistan, 
and Nepal.64 In response, Korean NGOs and transnational groups rallied for foreign 
worker rights and reforms.65  
After more than a decade of revisions, the ITTP was finally replaced by the 
Employment Permit System (EPS) in 2003.66 The EPS was considered by many to be a 
victory for global human rights.67 It sought to provide transparency of the selection 
process, prevent corruption, and protect the human rights of foreign workers.68 It allowed 
immigrant workers to have the same legal rights under labor-related laws as native 
Korean workers, including the right to join labor unions, the right to industrial accident 
insurance, and a minimum wage guarantee.69 The EPS represents a significant 
improvement over the ITTP; however, it still has a number of restrictions. Foreign 
workers are restricted to industries facing labor shortages and any job changes must be 
                                                
62 Summaries of International Labour Standards. Publication. 2nd ed. Geneva: International Labour Office, 
1991. International Labour Organization, 1991. Web. 10 Apr. 2017. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Sookyung Kim and Jeong-Woo Koo. “Securitising, Economising and Humanising Immigration: The 
Case of the Employment Permit System in South Korea,” Asian Studies Review 40.4 (2016): 619-635. 
Print. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Dong-Hoon Seol. “Which Multiculturalism? Discourse of the Incorporation of Immigrants into Korean 
Society,” Korean Observer 49.1 (2010): 593-614. Print. 
 19 
approved by the Ministry of Justice.70 In addition, only foreign workers from countries 
that have bilateral agreements with South Korea are eligible to work under the EPS. 
Finally, the EPS only allows workers to stay for a limited period of five years.71 
The EPS was one of the first pieces of legislation to address welfare, human 
rights, and discrimination to support foreign workers in the 2000s. The rallying efforts of 
foreign workers, Korean activists, and transnational NGOs had produced an entire 
movement of legislation geared towards a more open immigration policy and the idea of 
multiculturalism. The government officially declared that it would fully embrace a 
multicultural and multiracial society in 2006.72 Some policies that then followed included 
the Grand Plan in 2006, the Act on the Treatment of Foreigners in Korea in 2007, Visit 
and Employment System of 2007, the Multicultural Family Support Act of 2008, and the 
First Basic Plan for Immigration Policy (FBPIP) in 2008-2012.73 These policies ensured 
government support for ethnic Koreans, foreign professionals, and foreign women 
married to Korean men.74 
The Multicultural Family Support Act initiated the establishment of 217 
Multicultural Family Support Centers and Global Centers that provide services and 
                                                
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Tae-jun Kang. “South Korea’s Immigrant Problem.” The Diplomat. The Diplomat, 12 Nov. 2014. Web. 
24 Feb. 2014. 
73 Junmo Kim and Yong-Soo Kwon. “Economic development, the evolution of foreign labor and 
immigration policy, and the shift to multiculturalism in South Korea” Philippine Political Science Journal, 
33.2 (2012): 178-201. Print. 
74 Ibid. 
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information for foreign workers, spouses and tourists.75 The government also created a 
points system that can move foreigners towards permanent residency.76 This system 
examines income, education, age, and Korean language proficiency in eligible candidates 
who have worked in South Korea for over a year.77 Foreign workers are encouraged to 
pursue an education and to obtain a high score on the Test of Proficiency in Korean 
(TOPIK), if they want to eventually become permanent residents.  
Since 2006, the number of immigrants in South Korea has risen by 9.7 percent per 
year (see figure 6).78 While South Korea maintains a relatively strict immigration policy 
compared to global norms, in comparison with Japan, South Korea has become more 
open in the past decade. Through advocacy, pro-immigrant groups created pressure to 
influence the government to move towards multicultural and inclusive policies. On the 
other hand, the Japanese government has only slightly amended their immigration 
policies, while continuing to expand training programs, which have been heavily 
criticized for labor abuses. The root causes of this discrepancy will be discussed in a later 
section. The next section will illuminate Japan’s policies for foreign care workers through 
economic partnership agreements. 
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Figure 6: South Korea’s Foreign Population Over Time 
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Chapter 3: Foreign Elderly Care Worker Policies 
Despite similar demands, Japan and South Korea have different policies for 
foreign elderly care workers. In Japan, elderly care work has attracted workers from the 
Philippines, Indonesia and Vietnam through economic partnership agreements. While 
demographic trends have provided an opportunity for care workers, they face attitudinal 
and legal constraints. The government has focused on creating new legal avenues for care 
workers to enter the country, instead of enacting policies to loosen the strict legal 
requirements they face. The new avenues are just as problematic because the same rigid 
restrictions remain, keeping workers from filling positions. In this way, Japan’s policies 
have been ineffective in meeting their demands.79 On the South Korean side, the 
government does not regulate and monitor elderly care workers as closely as Japan. In 
South Korea, the government targets ethnically Korean Chinese citizens, or Joseonjok, to 
work in the elderly care industry. Since 2002, these co-ethnic workers have received the 
most policy attention amongst foreign worker and immigrant groups.80 The government 
has repeatedly given these workers special privileges, which have allowed large numbers 
to fill elderly care roles.81 Therefore, South Korea’s policies have been efficient in 
meeting their demands. The following subsections will describe and explain the policies 
for foreign elderly care workers in Japan and South Korea. 
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Japan 
Classified as “unskilled workers”, foreign elderly care workers face many 
challenges in obtaining employment in Japan. These workers, from Southeast Asia, often 
come to Japan through foreign training programs or agreements, but face multiple 
barriers while attempting to stay. Elderly care workers must pass a care worker national 
certification exam after four years and nurses must pass the nursing certification exam in 
Japanese after three years. According to the Philippines Daily Inquirer, less than ten 
percent of the 500-600 Filipino nurses and elderly care workers admitted every year pass 
these exams.82 Candidates, with professional and educational experience, often fail due to 
language fluency. In this way, the exams are linguistic barriers that put qualified foreign 
care workers at a huge disadvantage. As previously mentioned, Japanese immigration 
policy facilitates short-term workers. Therefore, even when a worker is successful in 
completing all the requirements, their employment in Japan is still precarious. The 
government has not enacted any policies to support successful candidates whom desire to 
stay in Japan. In this section, I will dissect the current policies for foreign care workers in 
Japan as well as their outcomes and government revisions. 
The only real legal way for foreign care workers to enter Japan is through 
economic partnership agreements. Japan currently has economic partnership agreements 
(EPA) with the Philippines (2008), Indonesia (2008) and Vietnam (2009). While major 
immigrant groups in Japan are from China, South Korea, and Brazil, the vast majority of 
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foreign care workers are women from the three EPA countries.83 Officially, the 
agreement’s purpose is to promote free trade between the two states.84 In this way, the 
acceptance of foreign care workers is more of a foreign policy than a labor or 
immigration policy. An attached clause on a trade agreement. It is important to note that 
the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare (MHLW) denied the existence of a care 
worker shortage and claimed that the acceptance of human resources from Asian 
countries was due to national interests in terms of trade liberalization.85 In 2010, the 
MHLW stated their position clearly in the following quote:   
“In Japan, a potential elderly care and nursing force of more than 900,000 exists. 
The government should utilize such a potential work force first. Accepting foreign 
elderly care-worker and nursing candidates under the EPA program is therefore a 
special case. We open the domestic market to foreigners not due to the lack of a 
work force in Japan, but as a matter of trade.”86  
The rationale is that mobilizing a Japanese workforce is preferable to accepting 
foreigners, a controversial issue. However these bilateral agreements enable the migration 
of nurses and care workers to only a few designated Japanese hospitals and care 
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facilities.87 
As defined under the EPA, selected foreign care workers are considered people 
who enter and stay in Japan for the purpose of obtaining national licenses as certified 
elderly care workers or registered nurses.88 These individuals are expected to make an 
effort to acquire all pertinent knowledge and skills to gain this license.89 At the same 
time, the agreements stipulate that the hospitals or care institutions are expected to 
provide a supportive learning environment for the foreign workers.90 In this sense, both 
sides share a degree of responsibility in the workers’ attainment of a license. The Japan 
International Corporation of Welfare Services and its foreign partner counterpart are the 
state agencies responsible for recruitment, deployment and training of these workers.91 
These groups target experienced, trained candidates. A nursing candidate must have a 
nursing degree in her home country, while an elderly care worker candidate must have 
three to four years experience with some training certification.92 
Once accepted into the program, candidates enter a pre-departure Japanese 
language-training program for six months in their home nation. Upon arrival in Japan, 
candidates immediately begin studying standard Japanese for another six-month period at 
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a language institution. They are then assigned to a care facility, either a hospital or care 
institution, where they will work, learn Japanese, and study for the national examination. 
As the Japanese government does not monitor the daily operations of these workers, 
working hours and learning hours vary depending on the assigned institution.93 Workers 
are forced to attempt to balance their work, language study and exam study for a period 
of four years for elderly care worker candidates and three years for nursing candidates.94 
Those who pass the national exam become formally certified care workers or registered 
nurses, qualified to remain in Japan and work under a “designated activity visa” for up to 
five years. However, this goal has proven almost unobtainable, as the number of passing 
candidates for both positions has remained extremely low.95 According to the MHLW, 26 
out of 357 candidates passed the exam in 2015.96 A combination of barriers has prevented 
the success of foreign care workers and has forced many of these individuals to leave 
Japan.   
One initial challenge for foreign nurses and care workers is their classification as 
“candidates”. Although many of these workers have valuable experience working both in 
their home countries and abroad, as “candidates” they serve as care assistants and are not 
allowed to perform any medical procedures until they pass the national nursing exam.97 
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In some cases, candidates were not aware of this condition and were mortified upon 
arrival.98 These candidates find it shocking and demeaning to their professional status to 
perform such menial, basic tasks as taking out the garbage or changing diapers. This 
classification was based on recommendations by Japanese professional associations. The 
Japanese Nursing Association (JNA) along with MHLW argued that acceptance of 
foreign workers would cause the deterioration of working conditions, decline in service 
quality and undermine the professionalism of Japanese care workers and nurses.99 The 
JNA, a powerful lobbying group, seeks to protect the jobs of its members, rather than 
support foreign workers who could alleviate the nation’s healthcare needs.100 They 
demanded a significant clause within the agreements that candidates must pass the 
national exam within a limited time period and if they fail, after reaching the maximum 
number of attempts, are forced to leave Japan.101  
Furthermore, the JNA released a position paper explaining that in order for 
foreign nurses and elderly care workers to be accepted they must meet the following three 
requirements: 1) obtain a license by passing the care worker national examination of 
Japan, 2) be sufficiently proficient in Japanese for safe care practices, and 3) be employed 
in a position the same as or better than those of Japanese nurses and care workers.102 This 
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stance was adopted into the agreement despite foreign claims that it created an unfair 
condition in which foreign professionals were demoted to trainees. In 2010, the 
Philippine Nurses Association claimed the agreement was a “cheap labor trap” where 
nurses and elderly care workers worked as assistants with low salaries and then returned 
home after attempting to pass an impossible exam completely in Japanese.103 The 
association claimed, “the language skills required by the JPEPA are so high as to 
constitute an almost impregnable barrier to our entry.” 104 
The first group of candidates, 82 Indonesian elderly care workers and nurses, to 
take the national exam all failed.105 As of May 2016, only 210 out of the total 971 
Filipino nurse and care worker candidates admitted since the beginning of the program 
have passed.106 Exams are administered every February. Nurse candidates can take the 
exam four times within their three years. However, elderly care worker candidates can 
only take their exam twice over four years.107 High failure rates are largely due to the 
emphasis on acquiring the Japanese language. With the strong support of the JNA and 
other Japanese care worker associations, the Japanese government requires all candidates 
to take the same exam as their Japanese counterparts. The Japanese government argues 
that a high-level of language ability is needed to properly administer care to a Japanese 
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patient.  Foreign care worker candidates struggle to master the language on a standard 
level, as well as the many required medical terms they will undoubtedly encounter on the 
exam. In 2015, an Indonesian elderly care candidate at Shinyokohama Parkside, said “it’s 
not just normal Japanese-we need to learn very specific terms, skills and knowledge.” 108 
These technical as well as colloquial words are very hard for the care workers to 
master.109 According to the Japan Asia Medical Nurse Association, even nurses with 
fluent enough Japanese skills for work still fail the exams because of these special 
terms.110 Furthermore, dialect and accent can be unfamiliar to these workers who study 
formal Japanese. 
According to Betsy Brody, “language training and education are key determinants 
of immigration integration in Japan.”111 In addition to the language training prior to 
departure and upon arrival, assigned care facilities are expected to hold an educational 
role in terms of language and material for the exam. According to MHLW, agreements 
emphasize, “it is important for accepting institutions to implement suitable training which 
is targeted at the passing of the national qualification examinations.”112 However, this has 
proven to be quite problematic. These facilities often do not have the strong educational 
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infrastructure needed to take on such a large burden.113 Prior to these agreements, 
education had not been implemented in many facilities, as Japan, unlike many countries, 
does not require the renewal of nurse licenses.114 Japanese language teachers were also 
not as familiar with the terminology and jargon involved in nursing and care work.115 
New educational resources and materials specifically for language learning care workers 
were only established in the last few years. Not only does the high level language 
requirement set these workers up for failure but also the differences in nursing 
education.116 Care and nursing schools in the EPA countries have different course 
requirements and educational emphasis than their Japanese counterparts. Therefore, often 
care worker candidates find both the language and content to be challenging to 
understand.117 Finally, given the limited time period of the programs, there is only so 
much a candidate can master.  
The EPA agreements stipulate that candidates are given a short period of three or 
four years to both work and learn. Consequently, candidates are forced to balance 
preparing for the national exam and working at the facility. This has created conflict 
between facilities and candidates as many employers refuse to view learning time as 
work time.118 After a full day of work, many candidates do daily eight-hour language 
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study sessions, leading to exhaustion and sleeplessness.119 A former Filipino care worker 
candidate expressed anguish when she said,  “The journey to becoming a care worker in 
Japan was indeed a mission impossible. . . . We were very tired physically, mentally and 
emotionally while studying to pass the board exam and working at the same time. All of 
us were pushed to study even on our rest day.”120 The emphasis on work over learning 
puts the true purpose of the program into question: is it about training and trade or 
gaining a source of much needed foreign labor? The supposed purpose of the program 
was again called into question when the Indonesian government decided to prioritize 
higher wages as passing the national exam was viewed as nearly impossible.121 However, 
the governments of the “sending” countries have not been influential in policy changes. 
Furthermore, these unreasonable requirements have not led to a national political 
discussion on the need for reform. 
A recent change advocated by the Abe administration and passed in October 2016 
is an amendment to ICRRA, which would entail the establishment of a new visa status for 
foreign care workers.122 This visa would mainly recruit foreign exchange students 
studying nursing or care giving in college.123 It would allow these students to continue to 
live in Japan after graduation and work as caregivers. The new visa status is valid for a 
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maximum of five years and allows for renewal, enabling care workers to potentially settle 
in Japan. Furthermore, the government aims to increase the proportion of foreign students 
who remain working in Japan after graduation from the current 30 percent to 50 
percent.124 The administration hopes this new visa will effectively lead to more foreign 
care workers in Japan as the high turnover rate and human resource shortage have greatly 
affected the nursing industry.125 It claims this amendment to the ICRRA is “responding to 
the needs of aging Asian countries,” and will help alleviate Japan’s labor shortage.126 
However, sources say this new visa is unlikely to attract very many students, as it still 
requires applicants to overcome a strict linguistic barrier. All applicants, like all EPA 
candidates, must still pass the national licensing examinations in Japanese.127 This strict 
requirement will surely prove to be a deterrent to interested exchange students. The Abe 
administration stated that the new visa system will be implemented by the end of 2017.128 
The concrete effectiveness of these developments remains to be seen in the coming years.  
It is worth noting that South Korea relies on co-ethnic Koreans, Joseonjok, as 
elderly care workers. Blood as well as a shared cultural, linguistic, and ethnic heritage are 
certainly key factors in South Korea’s policies. As previously mentioned, in the 1990s, 
Japan had preferential policies for co-ethnic Japanese, Nikkeijin, from South America. As 
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a result, large numbers of Brazilian and Peruvian Nikkeijin immigrated to Japan to fill 
unskilled labor positions.129 The government felt that shared ethnicity and cultural 
heritage made Nikkeijin workers the best source of foreign labor for Japan.130 However, 
these policies were considered fairly unsuccessful, as unforeseen cultural and linguistic 
barriers caused tensions in the workplace.131 Unlike South American Nikkeijin, Joseonjok 
have maintained their Korean language skills and culture. Furthermore, their economic 
situations in China have been generally less advantageous than the Nikkeijin in Brazil and 
Peru.132 In this way, South Korea has been able to enact liberal policies towards “shared 
blood” foreign workers in nearby China.133 It is unlikely that South Korea would be quite 
as lenient towards foreign care workers if the Joseonjok population did not exist. 
Currently, the EPA agreements are the only real avenue for elderly care workers 
to legally come and work in Japan. However, this program accepts only a limited number 
of candidates and has resulted in the success of very few. These experienced workers are 
forced to do menial jobs while attempting to become proficient in more than just standard 
Japanese within a short period of three to four years. Being held to the same standards as 
Japanese counterparts has proven time and time again to be a near impossible challenge 
for these workers. Furthermore, the MHLW estimates that the care industry will 
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encounter a 300,000 care worker shortage by 2025.134 As Japan is facing a huge labor 
shortage and, especially, a shortage of elderly care workers, there should be more barrier-
free options with less strict requirements for foreign care workers to come to Japan and 
be able to stay. The explanation for why the government has been reluctant to loosen 
restrictions will be discussed in a later section. 
South Korea 
While Japan targets care workers from Southeast Asia, South Korea targets 
ethnically Korean workers from China, also known as Joseonjok.135 Like unskilled 
foreign workers in Japan, these workers are temporary and only allowed to fill positions 
within industries suffering from a labor shortage.136 However, South Korea has far more 
foreign elderly care workers than Japan.137 In 2012, the Korean Economic and Social 
Development Commission estimated that half of the entire population of elderly care 
workers in the private sector in South Korea were Korean-Chinese, roughly 40,000 
workers.138 As previously mentioned, Japan hosts only a few hundred foreign care 
workers.139 What is the explanation for this striking difference?  
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While Japan only recently allowed foreign care workers into the country in 2008, 
South Korea has been receiving increasing numbers of these workers since 2002.140 Since 
then, the government has consistently adapted and created new policies to allow 
ethnically Korean-Chinese elderly care workers to legally work in South Korea. The 
Joseonjok workers receive special privileges over all other unskilled foreign workers, 
which allow them to adequately respond to the demand for labor in the elderly care 
sector. In this section, I will dissect the evolution of current policies and regulations for 
foreign elderly care workers in South Korea as well as their effectiveness in satisfying the 
demand. 
In May 2016, statistics showed that 42.5 percent of all foreigners in South Korea 
were ethnically Korean-Chinese persons (see figure 7).141 However, Korean-Chinese 
workers were not always welcome in South Korea. In the early 1990s, the government 
had a closed-door policy for unskilled Korean-Chinese workers in particular.142 Despite 
this policy, about 79,000 illegal, undocumented Joseonjok were working in South Korea, 
especially in the elderly care sector.143 As these workers were vital to the care industry, 
the South Korean government enacted the Employment Management System (EMS) to 
legalize their working status in 2002.144 The EMS allowed ethnically Korean Chinese 
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workers to work in 8 sectors, including elderly care, childcare and domestic work by 
issuing two-year visas.145 Under the EMS, only those who could prove family-ties in 
South Korea could qualify.  In addition, the hiring of other foreign workers into the care 
industry was made illegal and remains strictly prohibited today.146  
 
Figure 7: South Korea’s Foreign Residents by Nationality 
The government believed that if South Korea had to accept foreign workers, it 
was better to accept those who were ethnically Korean.147 Even though there was some 
concern about the Communist backgrounds of the workers and how the policy would 
affect the nation’s relationship with China, the government concluded that there would be 
less cultural conflicts with Joseonjok workers.148 The Ministry of Justice went a step 
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further to legalize the status of undocumented Joseonjok in 2005.149 The Voluntary 
Departure Program (VDP) made it possible for illegal Joseonjok workers to obtain legal 
visas by temporarily leaving South Korea.150 After a one-year period abroad, the VDP 
issued visas that allowed the workers to reenter South Korea and work for a maximum of 
three years.151 
In 2007, the government once again expanded the employment opportunities of 
Korean-Chinese workers with the Visit and Employment System (VES).152 This system 
allowed Joseonjok to work in 32 occupational categories with labor shortages including 
care work.153 Furthermore, it granted these workers the privileges of residence status by 
issuing H-2 visas.154 These visas allow simple entry and departure from South Korea for 
up to five years without requiring re-entry permits.155 Under the VES, Joseonjok without 
family-ties to South Korea could qualify if they passed the Korean language proficiency 
test.156 Unlike other foreigners under the EPS, Joseonjok with an H-2 visa can freely 
choose their workplace and transfer jobs in certain sectors. The EMS, VDP and VES 
demonstrate how the South Korean government has created special privileges for 
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Joseonjok workers that has allowed them to fill the need for foreign elderly care workers. 
As they share a language, appearance and culture, Joseonjok elderly care workers 
presumably alleviate potential problems in hiring foreign care workers. In this way, the 
South Korean government has expressed more comfort in allowing these foreigners to 
integrate into society.157   
In 2010, the government introduced a national qualification exam for caregivers 
to standardize care through the Long-Term Care Insurance (LTCI) system.158 LTCI 
provider organizations are required to hire only elderly care workers who have passed the 
national qualification exam and completed 240 hours of training (80 hours of theory, 80 
hours of practice and 80 hours of apprenticeship).159 In 1997, Japanese policymakers 
created their version of Long-Term Care Insurance (LTCI) with only in-kind benefits.160 
In Japan, elderly citizens using the LTCI program must go to government-regulated 
public care institutions. However, South Korea’s LTCI offers both in-kind services and 
in-cash benefits.161 For this reason, there are two main types of elderly care workers in 
South Korea.  
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The first are the native-born yoyangbohosa, which are certified elderly care 
workers who have passed the exam and completed the training.162 The yoyangbohosa are 
allowed to work in LTCI provider organizations.163 The second type are the Joseonjok, 
whom meet visa regulations but are not officially certified to work in LTCI care 
facilities.164 Most Joseonjok elderly care workers have not met any official national 
standards, although, they often receive on the job training or training in private 
institutions.165 These foreign workers often work in the less regulated eldercare market.166 
They hold positions in geriatrics hospitals, general hospitals, nursing homes, residential 
and group homes, which are not under the LTCI system.167 Unlike the Southeast Asian 
care workers in Japan, the Joseonjok care workers have no examination barrier since they 
mainly work in the unregulated care sector. They fill many of the available slots for care 
workers outside of the LTCI system.168 In recent years, the LTCI Act allowed Joseonjok 
elderly care workers to take the national qualification exam with no restrictions on age, 
gender, education level, or previous experience.169 However, there is no official data on 
how many of these workers have passed the examination. 
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Most Joseonjok elderly care workers are middle aged women, in their fifties and 
sixties from northeast provinces in China.170 They are typically second-generation 
Koreans whose parents left the homeland during the Japanese colonization of Korea.171 
Many of these women migrate to South Korea alone in order to earn some money to send 
to their husbands and families back in China.172 As they maintained their Korean 
language and culture, they have an advantage in securing elderly care positions.173 Unlike 
the Southeast Asian care workers in Japan, they face no linguistic and cultural barriers. 
These women are often recruited through outsourcing agencies that place them in their 
institutional care facilities or directly with patients upon signing an employment 
contract.174 At eldercare facilities, working conditions are generally poor, with long 
working hours and low wages.175 Despite these situations, many Joseonjok continue to 
fill elderly care needs throughout South Korea. 
While Joseonjok workers with H-2 visas make up the majority of foreign elderly 
care workers, marriage migrants also make up a portion.176 According to various studies, 
foreign spouses, mostly women, provide a noteworthy amount of unpaid care work for 
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their husbands’ older Korean parents.177 As international marriages now make up about 
15 percent of all new marriages in South Korea, the number of marriage migrants has 
greatly increased.178 Between 2002 and 2010, international marriages caused nearly 
787,000 people to migrate to South Korea.179 Joseonjok comprise 32 percent of these 
people, with ethnic Chinese and Vietnamese comprising 23 and 18 percent 
respectively.180 These spouses serve as elderly care workers within their new families.  
South Korea has taken a very different approach than Japan when it comes to 
foreign care workers. Indeed, both countries operate under the assumption that care 
workers should be temporary guest workers. However, South Korea has taken many 
strides to ensure empty positions in the elderly care sector are being filled with Joseonjok 
foreigners. Conveniently, South Korea is close in proximity to a large number of these 
Korean-Chinese workers in China who eagerly pursue economic opportunities in their 
ancestors’ homeland. Unlike the Southeast Asian care workers of Japan, these co-ethnics 
face no linguistic, cultural or examination barriers. This is part of the reason why they 
have been more readily embraced than other foreign workers.  
The South Korean government does not regulate and monitor the standard of 
elderly care as closely among these workers as Japan. However, Japan’s strict regulations 
ensure far fewer foreign care workers than necessary. Why does South Korea pursue a 
more open-door policy for foreign elderly care workers, making policies to invite them in 
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and not placing detrimental restrictions on them? Why does Japan maintain its closed-
door policy and strict regulations for foreign care workers? The next sections will address 
these questions with an examination of national leadership and the influence of civil 
society in these two countries.  
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Chapter 4: National Leadership 
In order to explain why these policies have diverged, we must understand the role 
of the national leaders and government in Japan and South Korea. Japan’s Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) has controlled the government for decades. Fundamentally 
conservative, the LDP has made little effort to ease the strict regulations on foreign care 
workers.181 Only recently, in 2016, has the current prime minister, Shinzo Abe, made 
mild adjustments to the restrictive policies.182 However, in South Korea the regime has 
been more liberal in the past few decades.183 Throughout the 2000s, presidents from 
different political parties have fostered the idea of “Multicultural Korea” and have led 
their governments towards the enactment of more open policies for foreign workers.184 
The different national leadership in these two countries has greatly influenced the 
directions of their policies. The following subsections will illuminate national leadership 
in Japan and South Korea, as well as how the governments have contributed to different 
policies for foreign elderly care workers. 
Japan 
In Japan, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has controlled the Japanese 
government almost uninterrupted for most of the postwar period. This powerful, center-
right party frequently promotes a closed-door immigration policy for unskilled foreign 
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workers. In an interview in 2016, Takeshi Noda, an adviser to the LDP panel, spoke of 
immigration “Domestically, there is a big allergy. As a politician, one must be aware of 
that.”185 The LDP, a fundamentally conservative party, risks losing votes from 
professional associations, conservative voters and workers if they promote a more open 
policy. In particular, the Japanese Nurse’s Association (JNA) is plays an important part in 
gathering the vote for the LDP. Rural regions, where anti-immigrant sentiments are 
prevalent, are also strong voter bases. In this way, the dominant LDP must be careful in 
its actions towards foreign workers and immigration. However, these organized voters 
are less influential since the 1994 electoral reforms. The LDP’s primary opposition party, 
the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), has also taken a reluctant stance towards loosening 
immigration policies. Although in power from 2009-2012, this center-leftist party did not 
advocate for any strong immigration policy.186  
Perhaps one of the biggest leaders in shaping immigration policy is the Ministry 
of Justice (MOJ). In Japan’s “bureaucracy-dominated policymaking regime,” power over 
immigration legislation is concentrated in this ministry.187 The MOJ is responsible for 
legal registration, federal litigation, criminal prosecution and enforcement, as well as 
immigration and naturalization. In the past, the MOJ has strongly rejected any proposals 
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advocating for the loosening of restrictions.188 It continues to be very conservative in 
making any adjustments to Japan’s immigration policy.  
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (2006-07, 2012-) has continued to echo a conservative 
immigration stance through his administration. However, under his leadership, there have 
been some minor policy adjustments. Since he began his second term as prime minister at 
the end of 2012, the number of foreigners living in Japan has increased almost 10 
percent.189 This is not to say that Abe has been a strong proponent for immigration policy 
change. In 2015, Abe stated “as an issue of demography, I would say that before 
accepting immigrants or refugees, we need to have more activities by women, by elderly 
people and we must raise our birth rate. There are many things that we should do before 
accepting immigrants.”190 Prime Minister Abe has promoted an increase in temporary 
foreign workers only as a last resort to compensate for Japanese labor needs. 
Under the Abe administration, small-scale changes were made to alleviate some 
of the difficulties of the exam for EPA candidates and increase the numbers of foreign 
elderly care workers in Japan. In 2013, modifications were made to make the exam 
questions more understandable for foreigners.191 The exam now uses more common 
expressions, furigana is given for kanji characters and names of diseases are now 
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provided in both Japanese and English.192 In addition, candidates are given thirty percent 
longer to complete the exam.193 In 2015, the government allowed EPA candidates to have 
an additional year for training. This extension made it possible for caregivers to take the 
exam twice and nursing candidates to take the exam four times.194 In 2016, foreign care 
workers were granted the ability to seek employment at providers of home-based nursing 
care. Previously, workers were not allowed to work as visiting caregivers.195 Although 
this change has not been implemented yet, the government hopes it will widen the 
employment prospects for these workers. Despite these changes, Abe’s stance is still 
limited, not completely transformative, and will surely face opposition as well as support. 
Currently, Abe still refuses to refer to any changes towards foreigners as ‘immigration 
policy’, maintaining his belief that migrants are short-term guests who will return 
home.196 
National leadership in Japan has been conservative and has spoken out against 
immigration as a means to combat labor shortages. Major political parties, as well as the 
Ministry of Justice, have taken conservative positions towards acceptance of foreign 
workers. As a result, elderly care workers have very limited opportunities to come to 
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Japan. As I will explain in a later section, attitudes towards immigration in Japan tend to 
be negative. 
South Korea 
In South Korea, leaders from both the conservative and liberal parties have 
promoted the acceptance of foreign workers. While the nation has had conservative 
leadership for almost a decade, presidents since the 2000s have promoted more liberal 
policies for foreign elderly care workers.197 Previously, presidents, Roh Tae-woo (1988-
1993) and Kim Young-sam (1993-1998), contributed to an increase in foreign workers 
through the establishment of training programs, such as the ITTP.198 However, the 
acceptance of Joseonjok care workers was only strongly advocated by the pro-
reunification oriented political regimes of Kim Dae-Jung (1998-2003) and Roh Moo-
hyun (2003-2008).199 Under these progressive presidents, the Employment Management 
System, Voluntary Departure Program, and the Visit and Employment System were all 
instituted.200 As previously discussed, these programs greatly assisted Joseonjok elderly 
care workers in legally working in South Korea.  
Roh Moo-hyun’s administration was especially proactive in issuing a series of 
reforms to improve the treatment of foreign workers. During the presidential campaign of 
2002, immigrant rights were an important issue as the NGO community was a significant 
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voting force.201 When Roh had won the presidency, he had campaigned on the platform 
to end discrimination against foreign workers and possessed close ties to human rights 
groups.202 Under Roh’s administration, the Industrial Trainee Program was replaced with 
the Employee Permit System. Furthermore, Roh announced that South Korea would 
embrace “Multiculturalism” and begin a campaign towards acceptance of foreigners.203 
The Act on the Treatment of Foreigners, which provides assistance to immigrants of all 
cultures and occupational levels, was established during his presidency.204  
Even the leaders from the center right Liberty Korea Party (LKP), also known as 
Saenuri, have supported efforts to loosen immigration and embrace foreigners.205 Under 
conservative president Lee Myung-bak (2008-2013), the Multicultural Families Support 
Act was enacted.206 The Multicultural Families Support Act helps marriage migrants and 
multicultural families of any status with language classes, child rearing classes, 
educational support for children, employment support, emergency centers and hotlines 
for victims of violence.207 This act has created a more hospitable environment for foreign 
care workers and showed a step toward a more open policy for foreigners in South Korea.  
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As previously mentioned, South Korea has been receiving large numbers of 
illegal immigrants, mainly from China, since the early 1990s.208 While former president 
Park Geun-hye (2013-2016) has cracked down on the high number of illegal immigrants, 
she also advocated for more immigrant support programs.209 Park’s administration 
expressed the importance of helping immigrants better settle down in South Korea by 
expanding diverse community adjustments programs to prevent any kind of 
discrimination.210 Under Park’s leadership in 2016, the government allocated over 676 
billion won, or roughly $588 million US dollars, to execute projects targeting foreign 
populations in South Korea.211 Park’s publically promoted the rationale that immigrants 
were essential for economic competition and government.212  
The current acting president, Prime Minister Hwang Kyo-ahn, follows Park’s 
policies closely.213 In 2016, he stated “Over the last decade, the number of foreigners in 
the country dramatically increased from some 750,000 in 2005 to 1.9 million last year, 
accounting for 3.7 percent of the whole population. A sound foreigners policy is needed 
now more than at any other time to induce social integration, secure national security, and 
boost economic growth.”214 As presidential elections will be held in May 2017, political 
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analysts predict the election of a liberal president in light of Park’s recent scandals.215 A 
liberal president would likely carry on the ideas of “Multiculturalism” as well as an open 
immigration policy that would continue to invite foreign elderly care workers to work in 
labor shortage industries.  
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Chapter 5: The Political Influences of Civil Society 
While national leaders have a direct impact on policy, civil society organizations 
have varying levels of political influence. In Japan and South Korea, the level of political 
influence possessed by civil society groups is quite different. According to Deborah J. 
Milly, advocacy for immigrant policies has generally had a limited impact in Japan and a 
substantial impact in South Korea.216 In Japan, immigration revisions are not a major 
agenda as public discourse on the issue is not nearly as strong as in South Korea. 217 
Immigrant rights groups and international NGOs in South Korea have far more political 
impact than their counterparts in Japan.218 This discrepancy helps explain why South 
Korea has moved toward a more open policy for foreign elderly care workers and foreign 
workers. This section will discuss the level of political influence that civil society groups 
have in Japan and South Korea.  
Japan 
The Japanese government has a lot of support in maintaining a restrictive stance 
toward immigrants, despite the growing labor demands. Although surveys show 
sentiments are changing, there is still a deeply rooted anxiety about foreigners eroding 
Japan’s “homogenous” national identity and provoking social unrest.219 Acceptance of 
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foreign workers is often seen as a threat to Japanese collective ideas of their country as a 
racially and culturally homogenous nation.220 Crime and terrorism in the wake of 
international terrorist attacks have also contributed to resistance.221 Many of these ideas 
are relatively unfounded, as both crime rates and other studies have shown; however, 
they remain popular sentiments. Negative attitudes towards the acceptance of foreigners 
are most prevalent in rural Japan, ironically where elderly care workers are needed the 
most, as aging populations and low birth rates there are severe.222 In these more isolated 
areas, lack of exposure and interaction with immigrants is perhaps an explanation for the 
most conservative views.223 Japanese organizations that promote these anti-immigrant 
views are often influential than immigrant support groups in policy decisions. Not only 
do many politicians take similar stances, but these groups have connections with media 
outlets to get their messages out to the public. 
Public discourse is not very focused on immigration revisions, but groups do 
protest immigration inclusion. One well-known anti-immigrant group in Japan is 
Zaitokukai, or the Citizen’s Association to Oppose Special Privileges of Zainichi.224 
Although the exact membership numbers are not known, Zaitokukai claims to have over 
15,000 members.225 This extremist group promotes an anti-foreigner message through its 
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ultranationalist rhetoric and demonstrations.226 Zaitokukai also has connections with 
cable television channels and manga artists, which help them bring their messages to the 
general population.227 Founder Makoto Sakurai has appeared on programs such as 
Channel Sakura to promote his organization.228 In addition, they have had some loose 
political connections to the LDP and the Japan Restoration Party, formerly known as the 
Sunrise Party.229  
As immigration policy change and the acceptance of foreign workers remain 
controversial topics in Japanese society, ultranationalist groups are not the only 
organizations with anti-immigrant sentiments. Numerous professional associations have 
voiced opposition to these changes as they feel the acceptance of more foreign care 
workers would lead to a widespread decline in quality and professionalism of the care 
service industry.230 Not only does the level of knowledge and education worry these 
associations, but also the perceived low language requirement. Under the trainee system, 
care worker trainees will need Japanese proficiency of N4 or higher under the five-tiered 
Japanese Language Proficiency Test.231 This level is the second lowest and is described 
on the test’s website as the “ability to understand basic Japanese.”232 The Japanese 
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Nursing Association (JNA) has claimed this low level of language comprehension will 
create language and communication barriers that could risk the lives and safety of 
patients. Furthermore, the Society for Teaching Japanese as a Foreign Language has said 
these low requirements “severely compromises their care giving duties.”233 The JNA and 
other professional organizations have significant political influence, as they often gather 
the vote for the ruling LDP. 
Japanese labor unions are also vocal advocates for restrictive immigration 
policies.234 Japan’s largest labor union, the Japanese Trade Union Federation, also known 
as RENGO, published “Views Regarding Premises and Criteria for Acceptance of 
Foreign Workers” in 1988.235 This group is concerned with both increased crime and job 
security; workers worry about losing their jobs to foreign workers. RENGO continues to 
hold a negative attitude toward the loosening of immigration policies that may allow 
more foreign workers into the country.236 Although it has backed LDP leadership, 
RENGO has widely known ties to another one of Japan’s biggest political parties, the 
DPJ.237 However, these labor organizations do not have a strong political outlet to 
influence immigration policy.  
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Japan’s business sector has been an important advocate for the expansion of 
foreign worker programs.238 The Japan Chambers of Commerce have been known to 
directly challenge the government’s stance on acceptance of foreign workers.239 
Keidanren, also referred to as the Japanese Business Federation, has also repeatedly 
urged the government allow more foreign workers to fill labor shortages.240 In 2016, 
Keidanren issued a policy proposal emphasizing the need for foreign workers.241 The 
proposal highlighted the need for further expansion of training programs to cover more 
industries, as well as the desire to target international students to fill positions.242 As 
Japan’s biggest business lobby with strong ties to the LDP, Keidanren has been 
influential in impacting policy. 
Lawyers’ associations, such as Nichirenben, advocate for foreign worker rights 
and more broadly human rights. Also known as the Japan Federation of Bar Associations 
(JFBA), Nichibenren sponsored a symposium, “Toward Achieving a Society of 
Multiethnic and Multicultural Coexistence,” in 2008.243 Furthermore, Nichibenren 
drafted a bill to protect foreigners’ rights and issued a report calling for the abolishment 
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of the Technical Intern Training Program (TITP) in 2014.244 The report claimed the TITP 
had created “an endless series of human rights violations.”245 Despite these 
recommendations, the TITP remains active. Advocacy organizations such as the 
Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan and the Council to Promote Multicultural 
Society have similarly proposed several policy changes towards better treatment of 
foreigners.246 However, like several other immigrant-rights groups in Japan, their 
political influence at the national level is marginal. According to Deborah J. Milly, “Civil 
society groups in Japan advocating national policy changes have remained largely outside 
of formal governance relationships.”247 This is due to the strength of the bureaucracy in 
Japan’s political structure.248 In Japan, policy-making is shaped more internally by 
initiatives coming from within the bureaucracy. As a result, Japan maintains it’s current 
closed-door policy.249  
South Korea 
In South Korea, the situation is different. Immigrant support groups and active 
NGOs, the majority of which are affiliated with religious organizations, have been very 
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influential in pressing the government for major policy changes.250 Immigrants and 
foreign workers have also taken their own initiatives to organize their own civil groups, 
which engage in activism for better working conditions.251 Together foreign spouses, 
documented and undocumented foreign workers, and native South Korean activists 
advocate for further acceptance and promotion of foreign workers’ rights.252 The business 
sector has also been successful in advocating for more foreign workers, as it maintains 
close connections with conservative political parties, such as the Korea Liberty Party.253  
In South Korea, organized immigrant advocacy groups have considerable political 
influence. Social movements in South Korea have contributed to a more open 
immigration policy for foreign workers. For example, the removal of the Industrial 
Technical Training Program and replacement Employment Permit System was the result 
of pressure from immigrant support groups and NGOs.254 Furthermore, there has been 
growing public awareness of the challenges facing foreign care workers.255 In 2015, a 
popular newspaper, Yonhap, ran a story in Korean about the many kinds of 
discrimination foreign workers face in South Korea.256 Government think tanks such as 
the Korea Development Institute (KDI) have begun issuing policy papers stressing the 
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importance of accepting foreign workers as a response to labor shortages.257 In one policy 
paper, the KDI stated “Because it is currently difficult to guarantee success with birth rate 
promotion policies, immigration policy should be set as a key state strategy and related 
laws and institutions should be adjusted to broaden the societal debate.”258  
Television, radio, Internet and other media outlets have also promoted support 
and inclusion for foreigners.259 Through public service news and entertainment, these 
media outlets have supported foreign workers and multicultural families. For example, 
Migrant World Television (MWTV) is operated by immigrants and temporary foreign 
workers.260 It serves as a popular multi-ethnic broadcaster.261 In addition, radio stations 
such EBS, TBS, Arirang, and Woongjin Foundation promote multiculturalism and 
diversity in their content.262 Furthermore, in 2008, the Woongjin Foundation established 
Multicultural Music Broadcasting in order to serve the needs of foreign workers, 
multicultural families and marriage migrants.263 This station showcases music from 
around the globe, as well as provides living tips, guidance and support for immigrants in 
South Korea.264   
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Since democratization, South Korean labor unions have been very active and 
influential in industrial relations.265 The Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU or 
Inochong) as well as the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU or Nodong) 
have promoted better treatment for all workers.266 These unions have not only openly 
advocated for foreign workers in the country, but actively recruit them into their 
unions.267 In 2015, the Ministry of Labor granted the Korean Migrants’ Trade Union 
(MTU) official legal registration, following a Supreme Court ruling.268 Labor unions 
together with South Korean NGOs supported this group’s struggle during this ten-year 
legal battle.269 This court ruling marked a great success for foreign workers all over South 
Korea. Like the Nichibenren in Japan, the Seoul Bar Association (SBA) is an active 
advocate for foreign workers. Since 1994, the SBA has had a consultation office 
specifically for foreign workers.270  
Just as in Japan, South Korea has their share of anti-immigrant groups. However, 
their influence remains marginal.271 Groups such as the Citizen’s Alliance Against 
Foreign Workers, Republic of Korea Patriotic Society, and Society of Victims of 
Pakistani and Bangladeshi Foreign Nationals strongly oppose looser immigration laws 
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and immigrant support.272 The largest of these groups, the Citizen’s Alliance claimed to 
have about 6,000 members in 2015, while the others had between 3,000-5,000 
members.273 These groups are similarly concerned with crime, terrorism and job 
security.274 In South Korea, anti-immigrant groups rarely get any media coverage and, if 
they do, it is always negative.275 This is true even in the politically conservative media.276 
They also have no relationships to any major political parties. In this way, anti-immigrant 
groups are very isolated and have little opportunity to influence policy or the public.277 
South Korea’s active civil society can be attributed to the recent period of 
oppressive military dictatorship from 1973 to 1987.278 Under authoritarianism, human 
rights violations and labor abuses were rampant.279 This legacy has contributed to a 
collective memory amongst the political leaders and activists, whom remain sensitive to 
human rights abuses.280 In Japan’s older democratic system, public discourse on these 
issues is less prominent. 
                                                
272 Ibid. 
273 Ibid. 
274 Junmo Kim and Yong-Soo Kwon. “Economic development, the evolution of foreign labor and 
immigration policy, and the shift to multiculturalism in South Korea,” Philippine Political  Science 
Journal, 33.2 (2012): 178-201. Print. 
275 Katharina H.S. Moon. South Korea’s Demographic Changes and their Political Impact. Policy Paper. 
No. 6. Brookings Institute, Center for East Asia Policy Studies, Oct. 2015. Web.  20 Feb. 2017. 
276 Ibid. 
277 Ibid. 
278 Keiko Yamanaka. “Civil Society and Social Movements for Immigrant Rights in Japan and South 
Korea: Convergence and Divergence in Unskilled Immigration Policy,” Korean Observer 49.1 (2010): 
615-47. Print. 
279 Ibid. 
280 Ibid. 
 61 
Conclusion 
In order to respond to increasing demands for elderly care, Japan and South Korea 
have turned to a temporary foreign labor source. However, despite similar immigration 
trajectories in the past as well as issues of labor shortages, aging populations, and low 
fertility rates, these two countries have elected different strategies and policies to respond 
to their demands in recent years. While Japan has only moderately opened its doors to 
foreign elderly care workers through EPAs with Southeast Asian countries in 2008, South 
Korea has consistently adapted its policies since 2000 to allow Joseonjok care workers to 
fill their elderly care needs. As a result, Japan has accepted only a few hundred care 
workers, while South Korea’s Joseonjok workers constitute over half of the elderly care 
workforce, some 40,000 workers.281  
This policy divergence can be explained by national leadership and the political 
influence of civil society. Japan’s LDP is a dominant national leader, which has 
maintained strict immigration laws and views foreign labor as a last resort to solving any 
demographic issues.282 In this way, their policies have been more conservative. 
Meanwhile, South Korea’s national leadership from both progressive and conservative 
parties has advocated for the acceptance of foreign workers and enacted policy to assist 
foreign workers with legal employment. As a result, their policies have been more liberal. 
Furthermore, South Korea has a lively civil society with many immigration support 
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groups with enough political influence to sway the president and the bureaucracy. In 
Japan, different groups have political connections. Recent democratization in South 
Korea has also sparked a public discourse on human rights activism. However, the same 
issues are not a major agenda of civil society in Japan. As a result, South Korea has 
enacted a more open immigration policy than Japan. 
In the context of transnational migrant care, this comparative analysis shows how 
countries coming from similar immigration trajectories have produced divergent 
immigration policies. This paper demonstrates how a relatively closed country like South 
Korea transformed its policies to meet elderly care demands, while a similar country like 
Japan has chosen to maintain restrictive policies. In a larger context, this analysis has 
highlighted the political factors and influences involved in the enactment of different 
policy responses by nations facing similar demands. In light of the looming elderly care 
crisis, Japan’s LDP leaders should follow South Korea’s example and enact less 
restrictive immigration policies for foreign elderly care workers.  
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